By synthesizing the OWASP Top 10 2026, the OWASP API Security Top 10, the Fortinet 2026 Web Application Security Report, research on SSRF/cloud metadata exploitation, GraphQL security analysis, prototype pollution literature, and LLM/AI prompt injection research, the following 50 can be compiled. cyber-sec-pro

Access Control & Authorization

  1. Broken Object Level Authorization (BOLA/IDOR) — APIs expose object identifiers directly in URLs; 3.73% of tested applications contain at least one BOLA vulnerability, making it the #1 web app risk for 2026. cyberpress
  2. Broken Function Level Authorization (BFLA) — Administrative or privileged API endpoints lack proper function-level access control checks; attackers enumerate hidden endpoints via parameter fuzzing. blog.axway
  3. Vertical privilege escalation via parameter manipulation — Role parameters, cookies, or JWT claims are client-controllable; server-side revalidation is inconsistent across multi-step workflows. cyberpress
  4. Multi-tenant data isolation enforcement — Shared-database multi-tenant applications leak data across tenants when authorization checks are applied at the query level rather than at the data-access layer. appsecmaster
  5. OAuth 2.0 scope confusion and token replay — Insufficient scope validation allows access tokens issued for one resource to be replayed against another; dynamic client registration broadens the attack surface. blog.axway
  6. JWT algorithm confusion attacks — Tokens signed with HS256 can be forged by switching the algorithm header to “none” or abusing RS256/HS256 confusion; library-level mitigations are inconsistently applied. cyberpress

Injection & Code Execution

  1. SQL injection in ORM-generated queries — ORMs (Prisma, Sequelize, Entity Framework) are not immune; raw query escapes, dynamic ORDER BY clauses, and LIKE patterns remain injection points. cyberpress
  2. NoSQL injection in document databases — MongoDB, CouchDB, and Elasticsearch accept operator injection ($gt, $ne, $where); JavaScript-based query languages enable full RCE via eval. cyberpress
  3. Server-Side Template Injection (SSTI) — Jinja2, Twig, Freemarker, and Velocity render user-controlled templates; sandbox escapes in Twig and Freemarker demonstrate complete server compromise. linkedin
  4. OS command injection via chained parameters — Input sanitization on individual parameters is bypassed through argument injection, whitespace manipulation, and IFS character abuse. cyberpress
  5. XXE (XML External Entity) in legacy integrations — SAML, SOAP, and SVG parsers process XML with external entity resolution enabled; disabling DTD processing is inconsistent across XML libraries. cyberpress
  6. Expression Language (EL) injection — Spring SpEL, OGNL (Struts), and JBoss EL evaluate user input as expressions; OGNL injection led to the Equifax breach and remains exploitable in legacy Java stacks. linkedin
  7. LDAP injection in authentication flows — Directory search filters constructed from user input allow authentication bypass and directory enumeration; wildcards and Boolean logic injection persist. cyberpress

Server-Side Request Forgery (SSRF)

  1. SSRF to cloud metadata services (IMDS) — SSRF vulnerabilities allow attackers to query 169.254.169.254 to steal IAM credentials; IMDSv2 mitigates but 24% of web apps remain vulnerable and many instances still run IMDSv1. rootshell.yanivhaliwa
  2. Blind SSRF via out-of-band channels — SSRF that returns no response body is exploitable via DNS rebinding, where a hostname initially resolves to a public IP then re-resolves to 127.0.0.1 after the SSRF check. tigerstrike
  3. SSRF filter bypass via protocol smuggling — Attackers use gopher://, dict://, file://, and ftp:// schemes to reach internal services; URL parsers handle scheme normalization inconsistently across libraries. payloadplayground
  4. SSRF in serverless and edge functions — Ephemeral compute environments make SSRF exploitation harder to detect and trace; egress filtering is not applicable to serverless functions. appsecbrief
  5. SSRF chaining to internal pivot — SSRF is used to enumerate internal services, then pivot through Redis, Memcached, or internal APIs; cloud SSRF attacks surged 452% between 2023 and 2024. appsecbrief

API Security

  1. API shadow endpoints and version sprawl — Undocumented, deprecated, or beta API versions remain accessible; organizations cannot inventory all API endpoints, creating persistent attack surface. appsecmaster
  2. Excessive data exposure in API responses — APIs return full object serialization including sensitive fields that the frontend doesn’t display; clients receive more data than intended. blog.axway
  3. Unrestricted resource consumption (API DoS) — APIs without rate limiting, pagination, or query cost limits are vulnerable to resource exhaustion; GraphQL amplifies this via batch queries. aquilax
  4. Unsafe consumption of third-party APIs — Applications trust and consume data from external APIs without validation; compromised third-party APIs inject malicious payloads into downstream consumers. blog.axway
  5. REST API parameter pollution — Multiple parameters with the same name or HPP (HTTP Parameter Pollution) bypass input validation; server-side frameworks handle duplicate parameters inconsistently. cyberpress
  6. WebSocket authentication and authorization — WebSocket connections bypass HTTP middleware; authentication is established at handshake but authorization is not enforced per-message. cyberpress

GraphQL-Specific Challenges

  1. Introspection-based schema disclosure — GraphQL introspection reveals the complete data model, field names, and relationships to any client; disabling introspection in production is inconsistently practiced. invicti
  2. Query depth and circular reference DoS — Arbitrarily nested queries across recursive relationships consume exponential CPU and memory; graphql-depth-limit mitigates but custom resolvers bypass cost analysis. invicti
  3. Batch query abuse for rate-limit bypass — GraphQL batching bundles thousands of operations in one HTTP request; per-request rate limiters see one request, not thousands of operations. systemshardening
  4. Resolver-level authorization gaps — Authorization enforced at the query root but not in nested resolvers; querying post(id:1){ author { email } } leaks data when the author resolver lacks permission checks. aquilax
  5. Aliased query obfuscation — GraphQL aliases allow multiple field selections under different names; WAFs and DAST tools cannot distinguish aliased attack patterns from legitimate queries. systemshardening
  6. GraphQL injection via resolver arguments — Resolver code that constructs raw database queries from GraphQL arguments is vulnerable to SQL/NoSQL injection; GraphQL provides no inherent injection protection. aquilax

Client-Side & DOM Security

  1. DOM-based XSS in modern frameworks — React, Vue, and Angular sanitize by default but dangerouslySetInnerHTML, v-html, and template interpolation bypass DOMPurify; framework-specific escape vectors persist. linkedin
  2. Prototype pollution via recursive merge — JavaScript libraries using unsafe Object.assign or deep merge functions allow injection of __proto__ or constructor.prototype properties, enabling logic bypass, XSS, or RCE. developer.mozilla
  3. Cross-origin communication abuse (postMessage) — window.postMessage without origin validation allows cross-origin data theft; wildcard target origins (*) are common in production. cyberpress
  4. CORS misconfiguration enabling credential theft — Access-Control-Allow-Origin: * combined with Allow-Credentials: true or reflected origin headers allows any site to read authenticated responses. cyberpress
  5. Service Worker persistence attacks — Malicious service workers intercept all network requests from the origin; once installed, they persist across browser sessions and survive cache clearing. linkedin
  6. Web Storage (localStorage/sessionStorage) token exposure — Storing JWTs or session tokens in browser-accessible storage enables XSS-driven token theft; HttpOnly cookies prevent this but conflict with SPAs. cyberpress
  7. Content Security Policy (CSP) bypass — CSP with unsafe-inline, unsafe-eval, or wildcard source lists provides no protection; nonce and hash-based CSPs are bypassed via script gadgets and JSONP endpoints. cyberpress

Session & Authentication

  1. Session fixation in SSO flows — SAML and OIDC flows that don’t rotate session IDs after authentication allow session fixation; the relay state parameter is attacker-controllable. cyberpress
  2. Credential stuffing at API scale — Automated credential stuffing attacks against login APIs bypass rate limits via IP rotation, CAPTCHA solving services, and distributed botnets; AI-assisted attacks increase speed by orders of magnitude. blog.axway
  3. Multi-factor authentication bypass — Push fatigue, SIM swap, and OAuth consent phishing bypass MFA; NIST has deprecated SMS-based MFA but adoption of stronger factors lags. cyberpress
  4. Password reset token predictability — Time-based or sequential reset tokens are predictable; modern implementations use cryptographic random tokens but legacy systems still leak via timing attacks. cyberpress

Supply Chain & Dependency Security

  1. NPM/PyPI dependency confusion attacks — Attackers publish higher-version packages with the same name as internal packages; build systems fetch the public (malicious) version instead of the internal one. cyberpress
  2. Malicious package injection via typosquatting — Packages with names similar to popular libraries (e.g., reqeusts vs requests) deliver malware; npm and PyPI lack mandatory signing. cyber-sec-pro
  3. Compromised CI/CD pipeline code injection — CI/CD pipelines with overly permissive secrets access allow a single compromised dependency to exfiltrate all build-time secrets; 87% of AI-generated pull requests introduce security issues. cyber-sec-pro
  4. Subresource Integrity (SRI) gaps — Third-party scripts loaded without integrity attributes can be modified by the CDN or a MITM to inject malicious code; SRI adoption is below 15% of sites. cyberpress
  5. AI-generated code introducing vulnerabilities — AI coding assistants produce code with hardcoded secrets, insecure patterns, and outdated crypto; GitGuardian tracked 28.65 million hardcoded secrets in public repos tied to AI assistant adoption. cyber-sec-pro

Business Logic & Exception Handling

  1. Business logic abuse (race conditions) — Concurrent requests to limited-quantity endpoints (coupon redemption, ticket purchase) create TOCTOU race conditions; database-level locking is inconsistently applied. cyberpress
  2. Price manipulation and parameter tampering — Client-side price, quantity, or discount parameters sent to the server are not revalidated; negative quantities, integer overflows, and currency manipulation persist. linkedin
  3. Mishandling of exceptional conditions (failing open) — When security checks encounter unexpected errors, applications default to allowing access (“fail open”) instead of denying; this is a new OWASP Top 10 2026 category. cyberpress
  4. LLM prompt injection via web inputs — Web applications integrating LLMs accept user input that contains prompt injection payloads; these hijack model behavior to exfiltrate data, bypass safety controls, or execute unauthorized actions; “prompt-in-content” attacks exploit uploaded files to inject instructions. arxiv

Several structural themes recur across these 50: the authorization-everywhere problem (access control must be enforced at every object, function, and resolver level), the input-trust boundary erosion (user input flows through increasingly complex parsing and evaluation pipelines), the API-as-primary-attack-surface shift (APIs account for over 80% of web traffic, yet traditional WAFs and DAST tools are designed for server-rendered HTML), and the AI-accelerated threat landscape (AI-assisted vulnerability discovery, credential stuffing, and code generation are compressing the time from weakness to weaponization). fortinet