Phishing attack technically breakdown:
- How phishing attacks usually begin (initial vectors)
- What they lead to (post-phishing kill-chain)
- Which detection systems, logs, signals, and rules must exist to detect them
This is written from the perspective of enterprise blue-team operations, SOC workflow, SIEM rule engineering, and endpoint/network telemetry.
1. HOW A PHISHING ATTACK USUALLY STARTS
Initial Delivery Vectors
These are the most statistically common, real-world entry points seen by SOCs, DFIR teams, and threat intel feeds.
1.1 Email-Based Vectors
(A) Malicious Link (URL Phishing)
Attacker sends mails containing:
- Fake login pages (Microsoft 365, Gmail, Okta, Azure AD)
- Malicious Google Drive/Dropbox payloads
- fake “password expiry” or “new voicemail” links
- QR code phishing (“quishing”)
🔍 How detection works
- Secure Email Gateway (SEG) link-rewriting logs
- URL sandbox detonation logs
- SIEM rule: “Unusual HTTP POST to new domain following email click event.”
- DNS logs: new domains requested within minutes after receiving email
- Proxy logs showing page with form-submission to external IP/domain
1.2 Attachment-Based Vectors
(A) Office Macros / Embedded Scripts
.docm,.xlsm,.rtfwith malicious VBA, XLM, or DDE- Lures requiring “Enable Editing” → “Enable Content”
(B) PDF Phishing
- PDF containing URL redirection
- PDF with JavaScript to open malicious site
(C) Archive Phishing
.zip/.rar/.7zcontaining loaders (JS, VBS, BAT)- ISO/IMG “mark of the web bypass”
🔍 How detection works
- EDR events: Script host execution (wscript, powershell.exe, mshta.exe)
- Email gateway attachment scanning logs
- Sysmon: Event 1 (Process Create) for suspicious children of
winword.exe/excel.exe - YARA rules on attachment detonation sandbox
- MITRE ATT&CK mapping: T1566 + T1204 + T1059 (.js/.vbs/.ps1)
1.3 SaaS Account Phishing
Attackers impersonate:
- Microsoft Teams sharing notification
- Slack/Zoom invites
- Shared Google Docs activity
These redirect to credential-harvesting pages.
🔍 Detection:
- CASB / SSPM monitoring OAuth consent grants
- Azure AD: Impossible travel after authentication
- M365 Defender: “Suspicious login from unfamiliar location”
- Cloud proxy: New domain hosting look-alike login pages
1.4 SMS / WhatsApp / Mobile-Native Phishing (Smishing)
Used heavily for:
- MFA fatigue attacks
- Fake delivery notifications (FedEx, DHL)
- Social engineering to install malicious APKs (Android malware)
🔍 Detection:
- MDM/Mobile EDR telemetry
- CASB login anomalies from mobile devices
- SMS gateway logs (if corporate devices)
1.5 Voice Phishing / Callback Phishing
User calls a fake hotline → attacker instructs user to install:
- AnyDesk
- TeamViewer
- ScreenConnect
- Fake antivirus
This is currently one of the top initial access vectors for ransomware crews.
🔍 Detection:
- EDR alert on remote-desktop tool installation
- Proxy logs showing download of uncommon RMM software
- SIEM correlation: “User downloads RMM app following inbound call event”
2. WHAT PHISHING CAN LEAD TO (THE FULL KILL CHAIN)
Once the phishing attack succeeds (user clicks, downloads, or enters credentials), attackers proceed through stages. Here is the full technical chain:
Stage 1 — Credential Harvesting
Outcome:
- Attacker steals Microsoft 365 / Google Workspace login
- Gains VPN/Web portal access
- Gains access to Okta → lateral identity takeover
Post-phish signals:
- Azure AD: new conditional access failures
- Okta: new IP/device binding
- MFA push approvals from new locations
Stage 2 — Session Hijacking / Token Theft
Many modern phishing kits steal:
- session cookies
- bearer tokens
- refresh tokens
Allows:
- Bypassing MFA
- API access without login
- Silent mailbox access
Stage 3 — Malware / Loader Execution
Phishing leads to downloading:
- initial loader (JS/VBS)
- PowerShell one-liner
- HTML smuggling (JS delivers EXE silently)
Leads to:
- Cobalt Strike Beacon
- AsyncRAT / Quasar
- Lumma / Raccoon Stealer
- Ransomware loader
EDR will show:
- Powershell → rundll32 → remote C2
- Office app → cmd.exe → powershell.exe
- Parent/child anomalies (excel.exe spawning powershell)
Stage 4 — Internal Reconnaissance
Attacker enumerates:
- AD (LDAP queries)
- File shares
- VPN and internal web apps
- Cloud assets (Azure, AWS, GCP)
Detection:
- Sysmon Event 3, 4662, LDAP binding anomalies
- Windows Event 4768/4769 for AS-REQ/AS-REP spikes
- Azure AD Graph API excess querying
Stage 5 — Privilege Escalation
Techniques:
- Password spray
- Kerberoasting
- Token impersonation
- OAuth grant attack
- Golden ticket / silver ticket
Detection:
- Kerberos TGS request anomaly (4769)
- Excessive LDAP queries from user workstation
- Azure AD: mass consent to OAuth risky apps
Stage 6 — Lateral Movement
Examples:
- PsExec
- SMB remote service creation
- WinRM
- RDP lateral movement
- Cloud lateral movement via stolen API keys
Detection:
- Sysmon Event 3: connections to port 135/445
- EDR: PsExec execution or
psexesvc.execreation - Windows Event 4624 Type 10 (remote login)
- CloudTrail anomalous API calls
Stage 7 — Data Theft (Exfiltration)
Stealing:
- Files to MEGA, Dropbox, Telegram
- Source code (GitHub/GitLab)
- Cloud storage buckets (AWS S3, GCP buckets)
Detection:
- DLP rules: Increase in outbound data volume
- Proxy logs: encrypted uploads to external sites
- Cloud logs: LIST/GET/PUT spikes in S3 buckets
Stage 8 — Ransomware Deployment
Final stage for financially motivated attackers:
- Shadow copy deletion
- Encrypting network drives
- Dropping ransom note
Detection:
- Sysmon 23: File deletion bursts
- EDR ransomware behavior heuristics
- Process:
vssadmin.exe delete shadows - Massive file renames/rewrites in short time
3. WHAT SYSTEMS SHOULD BE IN PLACE TO DETECT THESE EVENTS
Below are the essential security controls, organized by detection layer.
3.1 At the Email Layer
Systems Required
- Secure Email Gateway (Proofpoint, Mimecast, MS Defender)
- URL rewriting + sandbox detonation
- Anti-spoofing controls: SPF, DKIM, DMARC
- Attachment static scan + YARA engine
- QR-scan detectors (for quishing)
Detection Rules
- “Email contains URL from new domain <7 days old”
- “Attachment detonated with high-risk behavior”
- “User reports phishing → correlate all recipients of same email”
3.2 At the Identity Layer
Systems Required
- Identity Protection (Azure AD Identity Protection, Okta Risk Engine)
- CASB/SSPM (Netskope, Prisma Cloud, Microsoft Cloud App Security)
- MFA enforced (preferably phishing-resistant FIDO2/WebAuthn)
Detection Rules
- Impossible travel
- Login from anonymizing VPN/TOR
- New OAuth app auto-grant
- Multiple MFA push rejects
3.3 At the Endpoint Layer
Systems Required
- EDR/XDR: CrowdStrike, SentinelOne, MDE
- PowerShell logging (Script Block Logging, Module Logging)
- Sysmon with tuned config
- Application Control (AppLocker, WDAC)
Detection Rules
- Office → cmd/powershell child process
- Droppers:
mshta.exe,wscript.exe,cscript.exe,rundll32.exe - LOLBins executing from user temp folder
- Suspicious network callbacks to C2 domain/IPs
3.4 At the Network Layer
Systems Required
- DNS filtering (Cisco Umbrella, Quad9, Infoblox)
- Web proxy with SSL inspection
- Firewall with egress filtering
- NDR (Network Detection & Response)
Detection Rules
- DNS request to domain less than 5 days old
- Unusual HTTP POST to non-standard port
- Large outbound data transfer
- DNS tunneling patterns (TXT record spikes)
3.5 At the Cloud Layer
Systems Required
- CloudTrail (AWS), Azure Activity Logs, GCP Audit Logs
- Cloud posture management (CSPM)
- Cloud DLP
- Cloud SIEM ingestion
Detection Rules
- API key creation from new IP
- Mass S3 object enumeration
- IAM privilege escalation attempt
- OAuth risky app consent
3.6 SIEM Correlation Layer
A modern SIEM (Elastic, Splunk, Sentinel, Chronicle) should correlate:
(A) Email → Click → DNS → Authentication
Rules:
- User receives phishing email
- Within minutes they click malicious link
- DNS resolution to new domain
- Login attempt from same user/IP/device
(B) Attachment → Script Execution → C2 Traffic
- Word opens → powershell.exe starts
- Outbound connection to rare IP
- EDR flags suspicious child process
(C) Cloud Account Phishing
- Email reports “SharePoint doc shared”
- URL leads to fake login
- Cloud identity logs show password reset attempt
FINAL SUMMARY (FOR BLUE TEAM)
How Phishing Starts
- Malicious links
- Malicious attachments
- Cloud SaaS impersonation
- SMS/WhatsApp phishing
- Callback phishing
- Social engineering via phone
What It Leads To
- Credential theft (password, tokens, sessions)
- Malware deployment
- Initial access broker foothold
- Lateral movement
- Data exfiltration
- Ransomware
Detection Systems Needed
✔ Email protections ✔ Cloud identity protections ✔ CASB/SSPM ✔ EDR/XDR and Sysmon ✔ DNS filtering + NDR ✔ SIEM with correlation rules ✔ DLP for exfiltration